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The 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was expected
to decrease discrimination against people with disabilities.  However,
discrimination against people with psychiatric disabilities may exist
in the legal system that is charged with implementing the ADA.  This
study describes and compares the characteristics of people with psychi-
atric and non-psychiatric disabilities who filed employment discrimi-
nation lawsuits under Title I of the ADA from 1993 to 2001.  The
Article examines actual and perceived outcomes of these lawsuits,
features of the surrounding legal process, effects of psychiatric disabil-
ity status on receiving a benefit from litigation, and predictors of
overall satisfaction with the experience of bringing an ADA Title I
claim.
The study consisted of telephone interviews with a national
stratified quasi-random sample of N=537 persons who had filed
ADA employment discrimination lawsuits in federal court.  The
study compared subsamples of n=148 persons with psychiatric disa-
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bilities and n=222 persons with non-psychiatric disabilities. The pri-
mary outcome was receiving a benefit from filing an ADA Title I
lawsuit, defined as a court ruling in favor of the plaintiff or a settle-
ment between the parties, with the plaintiff’s confirmation of having
received some benefit.  The secondary outcome was the degree of over-
all satisfaction with the experience of bringing a claim of employment
discrimination from the initial charging process through litigation.
The study finds that people with psychiatric disabilities fared
significantly worse in employment discrimination lawsuits than their
counterparts with non-psychiatric disabilities, controlling for other
significant predictors of litigation outcome, including health status,
plaintiff’s education, reasons for the lawsuit, and assistance by a
lawyer.  Plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities were also significantly
less satisfied with the overall process of filing a claim of employment
discrimination and bringing a lawsuit under the ADA.  The effects
of poor outcome on dissatisfaction were mediated by perceived unfair-
ness, lack of “voice,” and lack of procedural justice in the charge
process and litigation.
These disparities are not easily explained by differences in the
law, the behavior of employers or lawyers, or the effects of psychiatric
illness on perception.  Even accounting for the influence of outcome
on retrospective perception of justice, people with psychiatric disabili-
ties experienced less procedural justice than others.  While the dispari-
ties are clear, the causes are not.  There is no reason to suspect that
actors in the legal system—personnel in state agencies, judges, court
clerks, lawyers for the defendants, and even lawyers for the plain-
tiffs—are immune from prejudicial attitudes shaped by the stigma of
mental illness, but there is also no reason to jump to the conclusion
that the system is rife with “sanism.”  What should not be doubted is
the need for a vigorous response to these findings to ensure that the
system intended to protect people from discrimination does not
discriminate.
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“It was emotionally upsetting.”—ADA plaintiff whose case was
settled without any monetary award.
“Two years of hell.”—ADA plaintiff whose case was settled with
a monetary award for the plaintiff of $93,000.
I. INTRODUCTION
The “gap” has returned to the study of law and policy, and with a
vengeance.  Decades ago, legal scholars and social scientists were busy
showing that there was a difference—the implementation gap—be-
tween the laws on the books and what happened in the real world.  It
became so common, and so easy, to find implementation gaps that
the movement choked on its own success.  It was no longer news that
law on the books was very different from law on the streets, and schol-
ars moved on.1  Now, when the gap between what is spun by policy-
makers and what actually transpires seems wider than ever, there are
1. Early seminal implementation literature included such works as JEFFREY L. PRESS-
MAN & AARON WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION (1st ed. 1973); Donald S. Van Meter & Carl E.
Van Horn, The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual Framework, 6 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 445
(1975); EUGENE BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER A BILL BE-
COMES A LAW (1977); MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDI-
VIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES (1980); JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING
SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS (1983).  However, even as studies of implementation
began proliferating, the case began to be made that those who wanted to understand im-
plementation might better spend their time studying organizations.  For example, Richard
Elmore argued that “[s]ince virtually all public policies are implemented by large public
organizations . . . [o]nly by understanding how organizations work can we understand how
policies are shaped in the process of implementation.”  Richard F. Elmore, Organizational
Models of Social Program Implementation, 26 PUB. POL’Y 185, 187 (1978).
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global signs of a renewed interest in documenting and alleviating im-
plementation gaps.2  The fact of the gap is not news, but that makes
gaps no less challenging in both the moral and the practical sense—it
is rank hypocrisy to create rights or entitlements that are not enforcea-
ble in practice, but it is also no easy task to create regulatory systems
that can efficiently and fairly deliver the goods that lawmakers
promise.
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)3 was a sweeping and
ambitious attempt to enhance employment and other opportunities
for people with disabilities by eliminating barriers rooted in myths
and stereotypes about individuals with disabilities.4  Title I of the ADA
is the statute’s employment section.  It prohibits private employers
with fifteen or more employees, state and local governments, employ-
ment agencies, labor unions, and joint labor-management committees
from discriminating against qualified individuals with disabilities.5
The provision for enforcing Title I explicitly adopts the mechanisms
and remedies of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.6  Both ad-
ministrative and judicial enforcement mechanisms are available.
The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
has primary responsibility for the administrative charge process.7  It
shares this responsibility with state and local Fair Employment Prac-
tice Agencies (FEPAs).8  Under Title I of the ADA, individuals who
believe that they have been discriminated against in employment on
the basis of a disability may file an administrative charge with the
EEOC or a FEPA.9  Only upon receiving a “right-to-sue” letter from
either the EEOC or a FEPA may they then file a lawsuit.10
2. See, e.g., Emilio J. Ca´rdenas, The United Nations Security Council’s Quest for Effectiveness,
25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1341 (2004) (international diplomacy); Gabriel Gari, Free Circulation of
Services In MERCOSUR: A Pending Task, 10 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 545 (2004) (international
trade); Philippa Webb, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption: Global Achievement
or Missed Opportunity?, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 191 (2005) (international economics); Luke W.
Goodrich, Note, Implementing Environmental Law in the European Union: Lessons from the Bath-
ing Water Directive, 16 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 301 (2004) (international environmental
law).
3. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2000).
4. Scott Burris & Kathryn Moss, A Road Map for ADA Title I Research, in EMPLOYMENT,
DISABILITY, AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 19, 42 (Peter David Blanck ed.,
2000).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12112.
6. Id. § 12117(a); see also id. §§ 2000e-4 to -6, 2000e-8 to -9 (Title VII enforcement
sections).
7. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.1, .15 (2006).
8. Id. § 1601.13.
9. Id.
10. Id. § 1601.28.
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Our research on the implementation of the ADA has repeatedly
shown gaps between the promise of Title I’s employment discrimina-
tion protections and the enforcement practices of the state and fed-
eral agencies that implement the law.11  While we have recognized
that the ADA has many important potential beneficial effects on peo-
ple with disabilities,12 and that more people benefit from both the
11. In the first phase of our ADA implementation project, we analyzed the administra-
tive charge process administered by the EEOC and the FEPAs.  Kathryn Moss, The ADA
Employment Discrimination Charge Process: How Does It Work and Whom Is It Benefiting?, in EM-
PLOYMENT, DISABILITY, AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, supra note 4, at 118; R
KATHRYN MOSS, FILING AN ADA EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CHARGE: “MAKING IT WORK
FOR YOU” (2000); Kathryn Moss, Matthew Johnsen & Michael Ullman, Assessing Employment
Discrimination Charges Filed by Individuals With Psychiatric Disabilities Under the Americans With
Disabilities Act, 9 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 81 (1998); Kathryn Moss et al., Different Paths to
Justice: The ADA, Employment, and Administrative Enforcement by the EEOC and FEPAs, 17
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 29 (1999); Kathryn Moss & Matthew C. Johnsen, Employment Discrimination
and the ADA: A Study of the Administrative Complaint Process, 21 PSYCHIATRIC REHABILITATION J.
111 (1997); Kathryn Moss et al., Mediation of Employment Discrimination Disputes Involving
Persons With Psychiatric Disabilities, 53 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 988 (2002) [hereinafter Moss et
al., Mediation]; Kathryn Moss et al., Outcomes of Employment Discrimination Charges Filed Under
the Americans With Disabilities Act, 50 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1028 (1999); Kathryn Moss et al.,
Unfunded Mandate: An Empirical Study of the Implementation of the Americans with Disabilities Act
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2001) [hereinafter
Moss et al., Unfunded Mandate].  Between July 26, 1992, and September 30, 2000, 233,469
Title I complaints were filed with the EEOC or a FEPA.  Moss et al., Unfunded Mandate,
supra, at 25.  Of these complaints, where all the charging parties were entitled to file law-
suits, 195,657 (84%) were closed without benefits. Id. at 48.
Beneath the statistics, we found an administrative apparatus for enforcing Title I that
was simply too small in staff and other resources to properly do the job.  The EEOC
planned to receive 2,000 charges in its first year of existence, but instead received 8,856.
Id. at 9.  The number continued to increase steadily.  By 1975, the EEOC was getting
71,023 new complaints each year. Id.  Despite efforts over the years at improving enforce-
ment operations, the fact remained that most complaints were not being properly investi-
gated, and so for most people, filing with the EEOC or a FEPA was essentially a waste of
time and hope. See id. at 9–10.
Our current study takes the inquiry into the federal court system.  We have previously
shown that the vast majority of people whose cases are not resolved in the administrative
process do not take advantage of the opportunity to sue in federal court, but that most of
those who pursue their claims in court receive some sort of benefit.  Kathryn Moss et al.,
Prevalence and Outcomes of ADA Employment Discrimination Claims in the Federal Courts, 29
MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 303, 308–09 (2005) [hereinafter Moss et al., Preva-
lence and Outcomes].
12. Evaluation focused solely on the ADA litigation sometimes fails to capture the ben-
efits obtained from the voluntary compliance of employers. See Jeb Barnes & Thomas F.
Burke, The Diffusion of Rights: From Law on the Books to Organizational Rights Practices, 40 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 493, 504–05 (2006) (examining proactive and reactive responses by organiza-
tions addressing ADA regulations); Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Struc-
tures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531, 1544 (1992)
(discussing the role organizations play in shaping the meaning of employment discrimina-
tion law through interpretation).  It also tends to omit the empowerment effects that help
people with disabilities advocate more effectively for themselves in the workplace. See
DAVID M. ENGEL & FRANK W. MUNGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND IDENTITY IN THE LIFE
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administrative and court dispute resolution procedures than may
commonly be recognized,13 we have found that the nation has failed
to provide a level of legal services minimally necessary to assure that
plausible, good-faith ADA Title I lawsuits claiming employment dis-
crimination are resolved in a manner that is just for both employers
and employees.14
In this Article we present evidence of what may be the most worri-
some gap of all.  Our data, collected from ADA Title I outcomes in
federal courts and interviews with litigants, reveal significant differ-
ences between what happens to people with psychiatric disabilities
and those with other forms of impairment.  We analyze our data in
search of answers to two questions: first, are there “justice disparities”
in the ADA enforcement system, by which we mean durable differ-
ences in outcomes between cases brought by people with psychiatric
disabilities and those brought by people with other disabilities that are
not attributable to differences in the legal and factual merits of the
cases;15 and second, if there are disparities, what are the causes?16
STORIES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 243 (2003) (discussing the influence of the ADA
on the self-perception of those with disabilities); David M. Engel & Frank W. Munger,
Rights, Remembrance, and the Reconciliation of Difference, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 7, 44–45 (1996)
(exploring how those with disabilities use their ADA rights to legitimize their employment
positions).  While harder to document than litigation outcomes, these are real and valua-
ble benefits of the statute.
13. See Moss et al., Mediation, supra note 11, at 992–93 (examining the benefits of the R
EEOC’s mediation program); Moss et al., Unfunded Mandate, supra note 11, at 37 (same); R
Moss et al., Prevalence and Outcomes, supra note 11, at 307 (discussing the positive effects of R
ADA claim settlement).
14. Moss et al., Prevalence and Outcomes, supra note 11, at 308–09. R
15. We use the term “justice disparities” in deliberate reference to the issue of health
care disparities that has, for the past several years, galvanized action in health care and
public health policy.  See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON UNDERSTANDING AND ELIMINATING RACIAL AND
ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, UNEQUAL TREATMENT 5
(Brian D. Smedley et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter UNEQUAL TREATMENT] (summarizing ex-
tensive evidence that racial and ethnic minorities receive lower quality of health care);
Marsha Lillie-Blanton et al., Racial Differences in Health: Not Just Black and White, But Shades of
Gray, in 17 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 411 (Gilbert S. Omenn et al. eds., 1996) (reviewing
empirical studies on racial inequality in health outcomes).  Our definition of justice dispar-
ities is adapted from the Institute of Medicine report. UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra, at 3–4
(defining healthcare disparities as “racial or ethnic differences in the quality of healthcare
that are not due to access-related factors or clinical needs, preferences, and appropriate-
ness of intervention” (footnote omitted)); see also Ana I. Balsa & Thomas G. McGuire,
Prejudice, Clinical Uncertainty and Stereotyping as Sources of Health Disparities, 22 J. HEALTH
ECON. 89, 90–91 (2003) (setting out conceptual framework for distinguishing various
causes of disparities).
16. We assume that a disparity in justice outcomes or the quality of justice services
would, like health disparities, have a complex set of causes.  Race, class, disease, location,
and other factors have been found to interact in complicated ways to cause racial health
disparities. See UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 15, at 8 (summarizing the impact of lin- R
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The urgent question posed by our findings is whether the ADA is be-
ing implemented in a way that actually discriminates against one of
the most vulnerable groups the law was intended to protect.
The research reported in this Article, which was funded by the
National Institute of Mental Health, was taken from a nationwide
study of ADA employment discrimination cases initiated between the
July 1992 effective date of Title I and 2001.  We used a two-stage, strati-
fied, quasi-random selection to produce a nationally representative
sample of ADA Title I lawsuits filed in federal courts.17  Analyses of
case characteristics and outcomes were conducted on a total of 4,114
ADA Title I cases, using court docket files.  We also conducted tele-
phone interviews with a quasi-random sample of 537 people selected
from the larger group, which consisted of 148 people with psychiatric
disabilities, 222 with non-psychiatric disabilities, and 167 with indeter-
minate or both types of disabilities.  The findings presented here ex-
clude the latter group and are drawn primarily from the interview
data.
In Part II of this Article, we describe the methods we used to col-
lect and analyze our data.  In Part III, we present our findings.
Whether measured by the actual outcome of the case, or by plaintiffs’
perceptions of procedural justice, people with psychiatric disabilities
are less likely than people with other disabilities to receive a benefit
from their suit and less likely to be satisfied with their charge and
lawsuit experiences.  In Part IV, we consider the possible explanations
for these results, including differences in the case law for people with
psychiatric compared to other disabilities, and differences in treat-
ment during the prior administrative process.  We are left with the
distinct possibility that in both objective outcomes and perceptions of
fair procedures, there are disparities between people with psychiatric
guistic barriers, limited physical availability, remoteness of health care institutions, and
cost-structure changes to health care services on health disparities for racial and ethnic
minorities); Lillie-Blanton et al., supra note 15, at 428–29 (reviewing the effects of race and R
socioeconomic status on specific health outcomes).  Thus it is difficult to attribute all
health disparities to racism, let alone intentional discrimination, even though the evidence
strongly suggests that racism does impose a burden on the health of minorities at the
population level. See David R. Williams, Race, Socioeconomic Status, and Health: The Added
Effects of Racism and Discrimination, in 896 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD.  SCI. 173, 183–84 (Nancy E.
Adler et al. eds., 1999) (exploring the negative effects of residential segregation, limited
health care access, and discrimination-related stress on the health of racial minorities);
Kevin Fiscella et al., Inequality in Quality: Addressing Socioeconomic, Racial, and Ethnic Dispari-
ties in Health Care, 283 JAMA 2579, 2579 (2000) (acknowledging the impact of socioeco-
nomic status and membership in a racial or ethnic minority on health care disparities).
17. For details of this procedure, see Moss et al., Prevalence  and Outcomes, supra note 11, R
at 303–04.
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versus non-psychiatric disabilities.  As far as the causes are concerned,
we cannot rule out that the stigma of mental illness compromises the
fair treatment one would expect in the very process society has pro-
vided to redress discrimination.18  We conclude with recommenda-
tions for action to address what we argue is an urgent problem in the
implementation of antidiscrimination law.
II. METHODS
A. Study Sample Design
A quasi-random sample of 539 persons who had filed ADA Title I
lawsuits was interviewed in a telephone survey.  The sampling proce-
dure involved a random selection of sixteen federal court districts
stratified by size, thirty-six courts within these districts, three represen-
tative time periods for case filings (1993–1995, 1996–1998, and Janu-
ary 1, 1999–March 31, 2001), and 8,777 ADA employment
discrimination cases within these periods.19  The refusal rate for the
telephone survey was 32.3%.
The first part of the analysis included two subgroups: (1) 148 per-
sons whose claim of discrimination was based on psychiatric disability
associated with having schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, depression,
anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, or other psychiatric
illness; and (2) 222 persons whose claim of discrimination was based
on a disability associated with a non-psychiatric condition.  Informa-
tion regarding type of disability was obtained from court records and
claimant self-reporting.  Only if both sources of information agreed
were individuals included in the sample for analysis.
The second part of the analysis included a subset of the first.  It
was restricted to plaintiffs who were represented by a lawyer and
whose cases were decided by a judge rather than through settlement.
This population consisted of seventy-one plaintiffs with psychiatric dis-
abilities and eighty-two plaintiffs with non-psychiatric disabilities.
18. Michael Perlin has coined the term “sanism” to broadly describe the set of attitudes
rooted in stigma, stereotypes, and misinformation that drive and legitimate the unfair
treatment of people with mental illness.  Michael L. Perlin, “Things Have Changed:” Looking
at Non-Institutional Mental Disability Law Through the Sanism Filter, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 535,
536 (2003).
A finding that mental disability is treated differently than other disabilities would not
be new in American legal history.  In his exhaustive study of the civil war pension system,
Peter Blanck has also found that mental disabilities were seen as more problematic, and
compensated less highly, than other forms of war wound.  Peter Blanck, Civil War Pensions
and Disability, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 109, 165–66 (2001).
19. Further details of the sampling methodology are in Moss et al., Prevalence and Out-
comes, supra note 11, at 303–04. R
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B. Outcomes and Measures
We systematically reviewed court files for the ADA Title I cases in
our larger sample to examine outcomes and the proportion of plain-
tiffs who received a benefit.  Judicial files were available for review at
the federal district courts.  Associated docket sheets for these files
were available online.  To summarize and systematically record the
relevant data, we created the Judicial File Coding Instrument (JUFCI),
with a complementary version adapted to abstract the online docket
records associated with these cases.
Lawsuit outcomes were classified into six categories: (1) ruling by
a judge or jury in favor of the plaintiff (e.g., default judgment, sum-
mary judgment, trial victory); (2) settlement between the parties; (3)
ruling by a judge or jury in favor of the employer (e.g., summary judg-
ment, trial decision); (4) case dismissed or withdrawn by plaintiff; (5)
complaint still under consideration of court; and (6) status of out-
come uncertain.  The first two outcomes were considered beneficial
results for the plaintiff.  Outcomes were classified as “settlements” if
there was explicit mention of settlement or consent decree in the
docket data and all claims were concluded as to all defendants.  Cases
of voluntary dismissal without explicit settlement references were only
classified as settlements if the dismissal was with prejudice and no
events were present in the docket to suggest that the plaintiff had uni-
laterally dropped the suit (such as the withdrawal of an attorney or a
motion by the defense for sanctions).
In addition to the features and outcomes of the case, a structured
interview was used to examine plaintiffs’ attitudes and perceptions re-
garding the entire process of bringing an employment discrimination
lawsuit under the ADA.  We relied on procedural justice literature to
construct measures of our respondents’ satisfaction with experiences
in the administrative and judicial phases of their cases.  An enormous
literature on the positive effects of procedural fairness on litigation
participants’ satisfaction has emerged in the past twenty years.20  It
20. E.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUS-
TICE (1988); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); E. Allan Lind et al., . . . And
Justice for All: Ethnicity, Gender, and Preferences for Dispute Resolution Procedures, 18 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 269 (1994); E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution: Using
Procedural Fairness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 224 (1993); E. Allan Lind, The
Psychology of Courtroom Procedure, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 13 (Norbert L.
Kerr & Robert M. Bray eds., 1982); E. Allan Lind et al., Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice:
Instrumental and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 952 (1990) [hereinafter Lind et al., Voice]; John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A
Theory of Procedure, 66 CAL. L. REV. 541 (1978); Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Procedural
Justice: A Test of the Group-Value Model, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 830 (1989); Tom
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finds that individual satisfaction with legal processes is heavily influ-
enced by the way in which decisions are made and conflicts are re-
solved, even when outcomes are non-beneficial or the process is costly
or slow.21  People care about winning and losing,22 but they are also
influenced in the assessment of their experience by certain key fac-
tors: giving “voice” to their story, having an honest and unbiased deci-
sionmaker, being treated with dignity, and having a fair process of
decision.23  As Tom Tyler has put it, “[j]udicial hearings in general are
clearly used by people to gain information about their status as mem-
bers of society.”24  We constructed a series of Likert-scaled items25
R. Tyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants’ Evaluations of Their Courtroom Experience,
18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 51 (1984); Tom R. Tyler, What Is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by
Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103 (1988); cf. Edward
N. Muller, The Psychology of Political Protest and Violence, in HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL CONFLICT
69 (Ted Robert Gurr ed., 1980) (analyzing the relationship between political participation
and various psychological variables); Austin Sarat, Support for the Legal System: An Analysis of
Knowledge, Attitudes, and Behavior, 3 AM. POL. Q. 3 (1975) (examining individual satisfaction
with legal processes and institutions).
21. See, e.g., Robert J. MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of
Procedural Fairness, in 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171, 171–72 (John Hagan et al. eds., 2005)
(discussing study finding that terminated employees were less likely to file wrongful termi-
nation lawsuits if they believed employers treated them fairly).
22. Winning and losing do matter, such that the effect of fair procedure can appar-
ently vary with outcomes:
[P]rocedural and distributive judgments have multiplicative, interactive effects on
judgments of authorities and organizations.  Across 45 different studies, [one re-
view] found that the typical pattern is that procedural justice has stronger effects
when outcome ratings are low than when they are high, and outcome ratings have
stronger effects when perceived procedural fairness is low than when it is high.
Id. at 185 (citations omitted).
23. See, e.g., Lind et al., Voice, supra note 20, at 957 (voice); MacCoun, supra note 21, at R
176 (fair decisionmaker and process); cf. Muller, supra note 20, at 97 (finding that feelings R
of fairness were a better predictor of political behavior against the system than assessments
of the favorability of outcomes).
The notion that fair process matters is now well-established, but, as Robert MacCoun
notes in his recent review, it does not displace a range of other non-relational factors:
“People judge procedures and outcomes relative to their beliefs about what will happen,
what could happen, and what should happen.”  MacCoun, supra note 21, at 183.  Our study R
does not measure these beliefs, but it is worth keeping them in mind as additional explana-
tory possibilities.
24. Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Implications for Civil
Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV. 433, 444 (1992).
25. The Likert scale refers to an ordinal scale of fixed responses to attitudinal items on
a questionnaire.  This type of scale was invented by American educator, psychologist, and
statistician Rensis Likert in the early twentieth century.  Rensis Likert, A Technique for the
Measurement of Attitudes, in 22 ARCHIVES OF PSYCHOLOGY 140 (R.S. Woodworth ed., 1932).
The Likert scale measures a respondent’s degree of agreement with a given statement,
anchored by favorable and unfavorable responses on both extremes equidistant from a
neutral midpoint.  A typical Likert-scaled item has possible values ranging from one to five
or seven; the mid-point of the scale indicates an undecided position.  For example, respon-
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probing the strength of the respondents’ agreement or disagreement
with statements characterizing the experience of the initial adminis-
trative charge process, the fairness of decisionmakers and process in
their litigation experience and relationship with their lawyer (fairness),
whether they were treated with respect (dignity), and the opportunity
to tell their stories (voice).  We also included in our analysis measures
of complaint processing time.26
C. Statistical Analysis
We conducted exploratory factor analysis27 to determine which of
the Likert-scaled attitudinal variables grouped reliably together as in-
dicators of various underlying aspects of the claim and litigation
experience.
We used logistic regression analysis28 to examine the net effect of
psychiatric disability status on receiving a benefit from filing an em-
dents are presented with a questionnaire statement and are asked whether they “strongly
agree,” “agree,” “disagree,” “strongly disagree,” or are “undecided.” ALLEN RUBIN & EARL
BABBIE, RESEARCH METHODS FOR SOCIAL WORK 179 (1989).  The specific value of Likert
scaling is the “unambiguous ordinality of response categories.”  Id. at 179–80 (emphasis
omitted).
26. Plaintiffs in this analysis had their cases decided by a judge, but may not have had
any personal interaction with the judge or participated in any formal proceedings, as the
vast majority of these cases were decided on summary judgment or other dispositive mo-
tion.  Other actors in the system, from file clerks to lawyers, are in most instances proxies
for the judge in a plaintiff’s assessment of voice, fairness, and other markers of procedural
justice.  This should be considered when comparing our results to studies of individuals
who went through a complete judicial process, such as trials or mediation.  It is possible
that many of our respondents of all disability types were dissatisfied by their experience
because they had expected a trial.  As one put it, “I feel that I was denied my right to a jury trial.
I never went to trial to present my case and have my side told too.”
27. Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) is a statistical procedure that may be used to
identify an underlying pattern of relationships between a set of variables. See BRUCE
THOMPSON, EXPLORATORY AND CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS 4–5 (2004).  EFA may also
be used for practical purposes to reduce the number of variables that need to be entered
in a statistical model. Id. at 10.  Specifically, this technique examines whether, and how, a
set of observed variables may be linked as indicators of one or more common, unobserved
(unmeasured or latent) factors.  EFA is commonly used when a dataset contains a relatively
large set of variables of potential interest and the researcher does not make a priori theoret-
ical assumptions about the number of possible factors, their substantive nature, or about
which measured variables might be indicators of which latent factors. See id. at 5–6, 27.
28. Logistic regression is a statistical technique for examining the joint effects of multi-
ple predictors on a dichotomous dependent variable. See DAVID W. HOSMER & STANLEY
LEMESHOW, APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION 1 (2d ed. 2000).  Logistic regression equations
produce odds ratios, which estimate the average proportional change in the odds of a
predicted event (e.g., a favorable outcome in a lawsuit) associated with a particular value
on an independent variable (e.g., having a psychiatric versus a non-psychiatric disability),
holding constant the joint effects of other independent variables in the model. See id. at 1,
49–50.  For independent variables measured on a continuous or ordinal scale, the odds
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ployment discrimination lawsuit, controlling for demographic and so-
cioeconomic characteristics of the plaintiff and certain features of the
lawsuit.  Three intermediate domain models—corresponding to (1)
disability and health status, (2) demographics and socioeconomic
characteristics of the plaintiff, and (3) lawsuit features—were esti-
mated using stepwise selection with retention of variables at p<0.20.  A
final model was then specified with only the variables retained from
the domain models.
We used linear multiple regression analysis to examine predictors
of overall satisfaction with the claim and litigation process.29  We en-
tered blocks of independent predictor variables—disability status, re-
ceiving a benefit, and appraisal of fairness and voice in the process—
in stages to examine the significance of potential mediating effects.
The constructs identified in the initial factor analysis were scored and
entered as independent variables predicting satisfaction in these
models.
III. RESULTS
Exploratory factor analysis of attitudinal items regarding the
claim process produced a four-factor solution, with selected item coef-
ficients (or “loadings”) all above 0.60.30  The items are listed below by
strength of factor loading in descending order.  Negatively worded
ratio indicates the change in event likelihood per unit change in the predictor variable. See
id. at 49–50.
29. Multiple regression analysis is a statistical procedure that is used to examine
whether one or more of a set of independent variables are significant linear predictors of a
measured outcome or dependent variable. See DOUGLAS C. MONTGOMERY ET AL., INTRODUC-
TION TO LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS xiii (4th ed. 2006).  A linear association means that a
unit of change on the independent variable X produces a corresponding unit of change on
the dependent variable Y.  See id. at 2–3.  For example, if education is a linear predictor of
annual income, then each additional year of education predicts, on average, a certain addi-
tional amount of annual income.  Multiple predictor variables, however, may share some
association with each other. See id. at 64–65.  Thus, education level and occupation, which
both predict income, are analyzed using a multiple regression equation.  This equation
specifies the net association between each predictor and the outcome, holding constant or
“controlling for” the joint effects of other predictors.  For example, the effect of educa-
tional level on income is partly due to or is mediated by the effect of occupational level,
which covaries with education.  Multiple regression, in this example, would specify the net
linear effect of education on income (if any), controlling for occupational level. See id. at
63–64.  Finally, multiple regression yields a coefficient R2, which expresses the total propor-
tion of variation in the dependent variable that is accounted for, or explained by, the
entire set of predictor variables in the equation or model. See id. at 35.
30. As a rule of thumb, factors should have at least four or more items with loadings
greater than 0.60 or better to be considered stable and valid. See Thompson, supra note 27, R
at 24.  On that basis, Factor 4 should not be considered a “factor,” strictly speaking, be-
cause it was reduced to a single item.  As a single item, however, it contains face validity.
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items were reverse-coded.  The items were summed to create a single
score for each factor.  Each of the scales corresponding to the first
three factors demonstrated good reliability, with Cronbach’s alpha
levels above 0.70, as indicated.  The fourth factor consisted of a single
item—the only variable with a loading above 0.60 on that factor.
Factor 1.  EEOC (or FEPA) charge experience: fair procedures,
voice, dignity, fair decisionmakers
(Alpha = 0.86)
1. Agency personnel listened to my views.
2. Agency personnel responded to my concerns.
3. Agency personnel appeared to favor the other side.
4. I didn’t have an opportunity to tell my side of the story to
the people making decisions in my case.
5. I was not treated with respect in the agency process.
6. The system was really in favor of the employer.
7. Overall, I feel the outcome I received was fair.
8. Agency personnel didn’t try to investigate what happened to
me.
9. Agency personnel kept me informed about what was hap-
pening in the process.
10. Overall, I am satisfied with my experience with filing an
ADA complaint.
Factor 2.  Lawyer engagement in the case
(Alpha = 0.85)
1. My lawyer listened to my views.
2. My lawyer responded to my concerns.
3. My lawyer didn’t appear to fully investigate my complaint.
4. My lawyer was not available to talk to me about the progress
of my case.
Factor 3.  Lawsuit experience: fair procedures, voice, dignity, fair
decisionmakers
(Alpha = 0.79)
1. I was treated with respect in the court system.
2. The whole system was really set up in favor of the employer.
3. I didn’t have an opportunity to tell my side of the story to the
people making decisions in my case.
4. The judge was fair to both sides.
Factor 4.  Delay in processing complaint
1. The complaint was handled quickly, without too much delay.
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A. Comparison of Plaintiffs with Psychiatric and
Non-Psychiatric Disabilities
Table 1 presents a comparative profile of the two sample groups
with respect to personal characteristics, reason for bringing a lawsuit,
perceptions of the litigation experience and legal assistance, and out-
comes.  Plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities (n=148) were predomi-
nantly young to middle-aged adults (56% were under age fifty), white
(82%), and well-educated (80% attended college).  Forty-six percent
of these respondents were women.  Over half had household incomes
above $35,000 and 86% had health insurance.  However, many of the
respondents were struggling financially—only 56% had earned in-
come in the past year, 38% were unemployed, and 37% had received
disability income.  Only 62% rated their health status as “good” or
better.
By comparison, plaintiffs with non-psychiatric disabilities (n=222)
were more racially diverse (30% non-white) and less well-educated
(68% attended college).  A significantly smaller percentage (21%) was
currently unemployed, while a significantly greater percentage (80%)
reported their health status as “good” to “excellent.”
The two sample groups were similar in the proportions reporting
various reasons for filing an employment discrimination lawsuit, ex-
cept that job termination was somewhat more common among those
with psychiatric disabilities (60%) than among those with non-
psychiatric disabilities (51%).  This difference approaches statistical
significance at p<0.10.
In their subjective appraisal of how they were treated by the legal
system, plaintiffs as a group were quite unhappy.  Plaintiffs with psy-
chiatric disabilities were distinctly less happy than their counterparts
with non-psychiatric disabilities.  In particular, they were significantly
less likely to feel that they were “treated with respect” by the court
(39% vs. 52%, p<0.05); significantly less likely to feel that the judge
was “fair to both sides” (19% vs. 31%, p<0.05); and only half as likely
to feel satisfied overall with their experience of filing a lawsuit (19%
vs. 36%, p<0.001).31
31. Selected comments from an open-ended item on the survey give a flavor of the
respondents’ views:
“The time process was too lengthy; it took two-and-a-half years.” Plaintiff with a non-
psychiatric disability who received a settlement of $175,000.
“My issues did not get addressed.  My employer said I never told her I had a disability
and they believed her.”  Plaintiff with a non-psychiatric disability who did not benefit
from the lawsuit.
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These differences in perception correspond to actual differences
in outcomes of lawsuits filed by the two groups of plaintiffs.  Of those
with non-psychiatric disabilities, almost half (49%) received a settle-
ment from the defendant or a favorable court decision, compared to
only 37% of people with psychiatric disabilities (p<0.05).  Those with
non-psychiatric disabilities were also significantly more likely to re-
ceive a monetary award (37% vs. 25%, p<0.05).  Among plaintiffs who
received monetary awards, however, the amounts did not differ signifi-
cantly on average between those with non-psychiatric disabilities (me-
dian award, $19,500) and those with psychiatric disabilities (median
award, $27,500).32
TABLE 1. COMPARISON OF ADA TITLE I PLAINTIFFS WITH NON-





Characteristics of sampled individuals Percent with characteristic
Demographic, socioeconomic, and health characteristics
Age over 49 years 50.5 43.9
Female 38.5 45.9
White 70.3 82.4 **
Black 17.6 10.8
Other race 12.2 6.8
Attended college 67.7 79.5 *
Unemployed 21.2 37.8 ***
Any earned income in past 12 months 64.4 55.8 †
Household income above $35,000 54.1 52.0
Any disability income 26.2 37.4 *
Has health insurance 90.5 85.6
Health status rated good to excellent 80.0 61.5 ***
Reason for lawsuit: Type of discrimination claimed
Applying for a job 7.2 4.8
Requesting accommodations at the position held 26.1 27.2
Denied promotion 6.3 6.1
Demoted to another position 7.2 5.4
Fired from job 50.9 59.9 †
Other reason 20.3 18.4
Statistical significance: † p<0.10 (trend); * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
“I spent too much money, didn’t get enough money.  The process was too slow.  It takes
at least two years.” Plaintiff with a psychiatric disability who received a settlement
of $3,500.
“
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Characteristics of sampled individuals Percent with characteristic
Features and perceptions of lawsuit process [“agree, or agree strongly”]
“I was treated with respect in the court system.” 52.1 38.6 *
“The whole system was really set up in favor of the 66.8 76.3 †
employer.”
“I understand why my case turned out the way it did.” 58.1 48.2 †
“I didn’t have an opportunity to tell my side of the story 52.7 57.9
to the people making decisions in my case.”
“The judge was fair to both sides.” 30.8 19.1 *
“Overall, I’m satisfied with my experience with filing a 35.6 18.7 ***
lawsuit.”
“My lawyer listened to my views.” 88.5 86.4
“My lawyer responded to my concerns.” 73.2 75.0
“My lawyer didn’t appear to fully investigate my 32.6 41.5
complaint.”
“My lawer was not available to talk to me about the 17.5 25.6 †
progress of my case.”
“Overall, I was satisfied with the process [entire 23.7 15.0 *
experience with claim of employment discrimination.]”
“Overall, I experienced very few problems during the 22.4 19.1
process.”
Had lawyer 84.0 87.6
Outcome of lawsuit
Settlement or court decision for plaintiff 49.1 36.5 *
Perceived a benefit from lawsuit 52.9 38.5 **
Type of benefit:
Money 36.8 25.2 *
Something else 4.6 4.1
Both money and something else 6.8 5.4
High award (above $20,000) 12.2 8.1
Statistical significance: † p<0.10 (trend); * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Note: Percentages are based on the number who answered each question.
B. Predictors of Benefit
Table 2 presents the results of multivariate logistic regression
analysis examining the net effects of psychiatric disability status on re-
ceiving a beneficial outcome from a lawsuit, controlling for other sig-
nificant predictors of benefit.  The dependent variable was a
dichotomous outcome coded positive if two criteria were met: (1)
plaintiff received a settlement or favorable court decision, and (2)
plaintiff reported receiving a benefit from filing the lawsuit.  The first
column of the table displays unadjusted odds ratios expressing the bi-
to estimate whether plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities received higher or lower mone-
tary awards, on average, than those with non-psychiatric disabilities.  Professor Kotkin has
persuasively argued the anti-social effects of settlement confidentiality as a routine practice.
See Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 927, 970–71
(2006) (arguing that confidential settlements skew public opinion of the utility of employ-
ment discrimination and civil rights laws).
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variate associations between this outcome and predictor variables in
three domains: disability and health status; demographic and socio-
economic status; and lawsuit features.
With respect to bivariate associations, then, we found that benefit
from litigation was negatively associated with psychiatric disability and
positively associated with self-rated health status.  Benefit was also posi-
tively correlated with higher education and employment status.  Plain-
tiffs who were presently unemployed were only about half as likely to
have received a benefit from filing a lawsuit.  We caution, however,
that these bivariate associations do not by themselves establish direct
causality.  For example, it could be that being unemployed and having
poor health are outcomes that followed after losing the ADA lawsuit.
Among lawsuit features, plaintiffs who claimed discrimination involv-
ing promotion denials were significantly less likely to receive benefi-
cial outcomes compared to those who claimed other kinds of harm,
such as getting fired.
In the second stage of the logistic regression analysis, we specified
separate multivariate models for each domain, using stepwise selec-
tion at p<0.20 as a variable reduction strategy.33  The third stage in-
volved specifying a final model, which included only those variables
selected in the previous stage.  The final model (Table 2, column 3)
shows that plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities were significantly less
likely to receive a benefit from filing a lawsuit (OR=0.56, p<0.05), con-
trolling (in the final, reduced model) for health status, education, em-
ployment, reason for lawsuit (denied promotion vs. all other reasons),
and assistance from a lawyer.  The strongest predictor of any benefit
was having a lawyer (OR=3.05, p<0.05).  Education—having attended
college—also remained a significant predictor of benefit in the final
model (OR=1.37, p<0.05).  Figure 1 graphically displays the cumula-
tive effects of two key selected predictors—legal assistance and educa-
tion level—from the final model.
33. See HOSMER & LEMESHOW, supra note 28, at 116–18. R
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FIGURE 1.  PROBABILITY OF BENEFICIAL OUTCOME OF ADA TITLE I
LAWSUIT BY TYPE OF DISABILITY, PLAINTIFF’S LEVEL OF EDUCATION AND
SERVICES OF LAWYER


















No No Yes YesNo No
No Yes Yes No No
C. Predictors of Satisfaction
Table 3 presents the results of a multivariate analysis of the
predictors of overall satisfaction with the experience of bringing a
claim of employment discrimination, from the EEOC or FEPA charge
process through the lawsuit.  The unadjusted bivariate correlations
demonstrate that overall satisfaction with the ADA experience was
negatively associated with psychiatric disability and delay in processing
the initial claim, but positively associated with receiving a benefit, sub-
jectively appraising procedural justice in the charge process and litiga-
tion, and lawyer engagement.
Nested models 1, 2, and 3 sequentially examine the net effects of
three salient domains of variables on overall satisfaction with the claim
experience: (1) psychiatric versus non-psychiatric disability status; (2)
actual (monetary or other) benefit received; and (3) subjective proce-
dural justice, lawyer engagement, and delay in processing the initial
complaint.
The association of satisfaction with psychiatric disability status
seen in Model 1 was rendered nonsignificant when controlling for the
benefit variables entered in Model 2; thus, the negative effect of psy-
chiatric disability status on satisfaction was mediated by a worse actual
outcome for these plaintiffs.  In turn, the effects of the “benefit” vari-
ables shown in Model 2 were rendered nonsignificant when control-
ling for the “procedural” variables entered in Model 3.  Thus, the
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effects of benefit on satisfaction were mediated by attitudinal variables
such as fairness and procedural justice.  Models 1, 2, and 3 each se-
quentially provided better data correlation, explaining, respectively,
2%, 21%, and 51% of the variance in overall satisfaction with the
claim process.  Regression diagnostics indicated no substantial
problems with multicollinearity in these models.
D. Comparing Predictors of Satisfaction Among Plaintiffs with Psychiatric
vs. Non-Psychiatric Disabilities
Table 4 presents a stratified multivariate analysis comparing
plaintiffs with psychiatric and non-psychiatric disabilities on predictors
of overall satisfaction with the claim experience.  A positive appraisal
of the lawsuit process significantly predicted overall satisfaction for
both groups of plaintiffs.  For those with non-psychiatric disabilities,
this variable was the only predictor with net significance; actual bene-
fit was rendered nonsignificant in the presence of procedural justice
in the lawsuit experience.  In contrast, for plaintiffs with psychiatric
disabilities, actually receiving a benefit from the lawsuit, as well as pos-
itive appraisal of the initial EEOC or FEPA charge process, remained
significant net predictors of overall satisfaction.
Finally, to address the question of discrimination more directly,
we conducted an analysis of the net effect of psychiatric disability sta-
tus on perceived procedural justice in federal court (Factor 3), con-
trolling for whether the plaintiff “won” or “lost” the case (i.e.,
obtained a beneficial outcome), as well as perceptions of procedural
justice at the EEOC or FEPA level, lawyer engagement, and case
processing delays (Factors 1, 2 & 4).34  Without considering type of
disability, roughly half of the “winners” and 20% of the “losers” indi-
cated that they had received a high degree of procedural justice.  Lo-
gistic regression analysis, however, showed that psychiatric disability
status significantly lowered the odds of perceiving procedural justice
(OR=0.50, CI 0.28–0.92, p<0.05), controlling for whether the plaintiff
won or lost the case and two other predictors selected by the model
(college attendance and legal representation).  Figure 2 graphically
summarizes the results of this analysis.
34. For this analysis, we measured procedural justice with four Likert-scaled questions
regarding whether: (1) the judge was “fair to both sides”; (2) the plaintiff was “treated with
respect” by the court; (3) the plaintiff had the “opportunity to tell [his or her] side of the
story to decisionmakers in the case”; and (4) whether the system was “really set up in favor
of the employer.”  Specifically, procedural justice was coded positive if the plaintiff gave an
average response in the range of “agree” to “agree strongly” across these four items (two
were reverse-coded).
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FIGURE 2.  PROBABILITY OF HIGH RANK ON PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN
ADA TITLE I LITIGATION BY OUTCOME OF LAWSUIT AND
TYPE OF DISABILITY
Note: Predicted probability estimates were produced by a logistic regression model controlling for lawsuit














Plaintiff Won Plaintiff Lost
Notably, even among those who “won” their case, procedural jus-
tice was substantially less likely to be reported in the group with psy-
chiatric disabilities than in those with non-psychiatric disabilities
(predicted probability, 0.47 vs. 0.62).  Among those who “lost,” proce-
dural justice was reported by a substantial minority (30%) of those
with non-psychiatric disabilities but reported by only 16% of losing
plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities.
IV. DISCUSSION
The ramifications of employment discrimination are enormous.
The ability to find and maintain a job is essential to full inclusion in
everyday life.35  In addition to the economic benefits it provides, em-
ployment offers the chance for independence, the improvement of
skills, friendships, self-esteem, a sense of purpose, and meaningful
35. See, e.g., Leonard S. Rubenstein, Mental Disorder and the ADA, in IMPLEMENTING THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL AMERICANS 209,
209–10 (Lawrence O. Gostin & Henry A. Beyer eds., 1993) (discussing the barriers that
persons with mental disorders face in order to be included as members of society); Jay
Buckley et al., Developing and Implementing Support Strategies, in SUPPORTED EMPLOYMENT:
MODELS, METHODS, AND ISSUES 131, 131–32 (Frank R. Rusch ed., 1990) (discussing the
integrative effect of supported employment on work opportunities for disabled persons).
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participation in society.36  Being unemployed often means having to
depend on the public welfare system or assistance from family to meet
one’s basic needs.37  Being unemployed also frequently brings social
marginalization.38  It follows then that low labor force participation
rates among groups of individuals, like the disabled, need to be
viewed with urgency.
Although individuals with psychiatric disabilities seek work, they
are unemployed at a rate three to five times greater than the general
adult population.39  It is in this light that we consider the remedial
system for people who have suffered discrimination on the basis of
psychiatric disability.  It protects crucial rights.  It is not just a method
for resolving legal disputes, but also a service system that can and
should be operated within the broader ethic of care that is captured
in the concept of therapeutic jurisprudence.40  Our findings indicate
that this system may be itself infected with the illness it is designed to
cure—plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities are significantly less likely
than their counterparts with non-psychiatric disabilities to receive a
beneficial outcome from filing a Title I lawsuit, controlling for other
significant predictors of litigation outcome including health status, ed-
ucation, reasons for the lawsuit, and assistance by a lawyer.
Our findings amplify studies limited to published case outcomes.
A series of annual reviews prepared by the staff of the American Bar
Association’s (ABA) Mental and Physical Disability Law Reporter has high-
36. John S. Strauss & Larry Davidson, Mental Disorders, Work, and Choice, in MENTAL
DISORDER, WORK DISABILITY, AND THE LAW 105, 105 (Richard J. Bonnie & John Monahan
eds., 1997).
37. Susan S. Suter, Foreword to SUPPORTED EMPLOYMENT, supra note 35, at xiii. R
38. See Rubenstein, supra note 35, at 210, 213 (describing the social prejudice against R
mentally disabled persons).
39. Judith A. Cook et al., Integration of Psychiatric and Vocational Services: A Multisite Ran-
domized, Controlled Trial of Supported Employment, 162 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1948, 1948 (2005).
As we have noted in past work, however, it is important to assess the ADA’s impact on
employment rights in light of the limited reach of the statute: whatever the language of its
preamble might suggest, the terms of Title I only extend to the proportion of people with
disabilities who are able to work with minimal or no accommodation.  Title I cannot be
said to be anything like an affirmative action mandate to substantially improve the labor
force participation of people with disabilities. See Burris & Moss, supra note 4, at 31 (stating R
that the ADA was not intended to assure equal opportunity employment “by itself” (em-
phasis omitted)).
40. See Deborah A. Dorfman, Effectively Implementing Title I of the Americans With Disabili-
ties Act for Mentally Disabled Persons: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 105,
113–14 (1993–1994) (noting that the employment rights guaranteed by Title I of the ADA
increase the self-worth and self-esteem of those with mental disabilities); David B. Wexler,
Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 16 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 27, 32 (1992) (“Therapeutic jurisprudence assumes that, other things being equal, the
law should be restructured to better accomplish therapeutic values.”).
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lighted the extremely high win rate for defendants in published ADA
decisions.41  These surveys have also consistently found that people
with psychiatric disabilities fare worse than people with other disabili-
ties.  In 2001, for example, plaintiffs overall won 4.3% of cases in the
sample, compared to only 1.4% of people claiming mental illness.42
In 2002, the win rate was 5.5% for all disabilities and only 2.7% for
people with mental illness.43  In 2003, the overall win rate fell to 2.7%,
but there were not any victorious plaintiffs with a mental illness.44  In
2004, the overall win rate increased to 3%, but again none of the
plaintiffs with mental illness recovered.45
People can “lose” lawsuits and still feel satisfied with the process,
so we also examined the perception of procedural justice as an out-
come.  Regrettably, a substantial proportion of all the ADA litigants we
41. Amy L. Allbright, 2004 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I—Survey Update, 29
MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 513 (2005) [hereinafter ADA Survey 2004]; Amy L.
Allbright, 2003 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I—Survey Update, 28 MENTAL & PHYS-
ICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 319 (2004) [hereinafter ADA Survey 2003]; Amy L. Allbright, 2002
Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I—Survey Update, 27 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY
L. REP. 387 (2003) [hereinafter ADA Survey 2002]; Amy L. Allbright, 2001 Employment Deci-
sions Under the ADA Title I—Survey Update, 26 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 394
(2002) [hereinafter ADA Survey 2001]; Amy L. Allbright, 2000 Employment Decisions Under the
ADA Title I—Survey Update, 25 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 508 (2001) [hereinaf-
ter ADA Survey 2000]; John W. Parry, Highlights & Trends: 1999 Employment Decisions Under
the ADA Title I—Survey Update, 24 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 348 (2000); John
W. Parry, Trend: Employment Decisions Under ADA Title I—Survey Update, 23 MENTAL & PHYSI-
CAL DISABILITY L. REP. 294 (1999); Study Finds Employers Win Most ADA Title I Judicial and
Administrative Complaints, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 403 (1998) [hereinafter
ADA Study 1998].  The ADA Surveys are based on cases decided with an available judicial
opinion, and so are subject to some biases. See ADA Survey 2004, supra, at 513 (describing
methodology).  For example, they will undercount trial outcomes that are not appealed.
ADA plaintiffs do not fare as well as other civil rights litigants. See MARIKA F. X. LITRAS,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINTS IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS,
1990–98, at 9 (2000) (analyzing federal district court outcomes between 1990 and 1998);
David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of California Employment
Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and
Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 511, 545 (2003) (finding that disability discrimination
cases had lower plaintiff win rates than employment discrimination cases generally in Cali-
fornia courts).  And there is an extensive literature seeking to explain why. See generally
Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., “Substantially Limited” Protection from Disability Discrimination: The
Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409
(1997) (discussing how courts have misconstrued and restricted the ADA definition of disa-
bility, making it more difficult for ADA plaintiffs to win their claims); Cary LaCheen, Achy
Breaky Pelvis, Lumber Lung and Juggler’s Despair: The Portrayal of the Americans with Disabilities
Act on Television and Radio, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 223 (2000) (cataloguing negative
stereotypes amplified in media reports on ADA trials).
42. ADA Survey 2001, supra note 41, at 397–98. R
43. ADA Survey 2002, supra note 41, at 389. R
44. ADA Survey 2003, supra note 41, at 322–23. R
45. ADA Survey 2004, supra note 41, at 515–16. R
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interviewed (and on some measures a substantial majority) were un-
happy with the fairness of the procedures they experienced, but plain-
tiffs with psychiatric disabilities were significantly less satisfied than
plaintiffs with non-psychiatric disabilities.  People with psychiatric disa-
bilities were significantly less likely than people with other disabilities
to feel that they had a chance to tell their stories, that they were
treated with dignity, or that decisionmakers were fair.  While poor out-
come appears to be the root cause of dissatisfaction in the process for
people with psychiatric disabilities, the perception of procedural un-
fairness adds insult to injury.
Has therapeutic jurisprudence somehow become iatrogenic liti-
gation?  It is a serious charge, and so we consider a range of possible
explanations.  Most obviously, a pattern of different outcomes is not
the same thing as a disparity in the sense we use that term—psychiat-
ric disability claims may as a whole be legally or factually weaker than
other disability claims, in which case systematically poorer outcomes
do not suggest a disparity in the day-to-day administration of the ADA.46
We will also consider whether the difference in outcomes may be ex-
plained by defendant or lawyer behavior rather than the behavior of
judges and administrative personnel.  Finally, we will consider
whether we can trust what people with psychiatric disabilities tell us
about their unhappy experiences.
46. We write of the “administration” of the ADA because the governing case law, as
shaped by both trial and appellate courts, may reflect myths, stereotypes, and prejudices
concerning the mentally disabled, but the lawyers and judges working on a particular case
are nonetheless bound by those decisions.  Judges could apply unfair principles fairly and
lawyers might lower their estimate of a case’s chances, even if they themselves were free of
bias.
It is here that the analogy to health disparities breaks down.  One might phrase a
specific disparity question in health this way: two similar patients (alike in job, income, and
education), but different in race, have blood pressures of 190/110, a score that indicates a
need for anti-hypertension treatment.  They receive different treatment.  Hypertension has
a reasonably objective clinical definition—one either meets it or does not.  If the two pa-
tients are treated differently, we have a disparity and the inquiry shifts to the origins of this
disparity.  In law, however, every claim of discrimination is unique, and the claim is evalu-
ated by standards that themselves are in steady evolution and may reflect bias or stereotyp-
ing.  Even if it were shown that the case law on disability was substantially less favorable to
plaintiffs with mental disabilities, or that it was harder to prove such cases because of
greater diagnostic uncertainty (for example), we would only get to the question of whether
the case law itself reflected biases or stereotypes of judges regarding people with mental
disabilities.
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A. Is There a Justice Disparity or Can Different Outcomes Be Explained by
Differences in the Validity of the Cases?
The simplest explanation for a different pattern of outcomes like
this would be that losing claims have less intrinsic legal validity.  If
cases brought by people with psychiatric disabilities are weaker than
those brought by people with other disabilities, then a properly func-
tioning court system would steer those cases to poorer outcomes.  At
the outset, we must reject this as a justification for poorer perceptions
of procedural justice.  All litigants should be treated fairly, and litiga-
tion can be therapeutic if it provides a fair opportunity for people to
find out that their perceptions of discrimination were incorrect.  Our
findings reveal that for people with psychiatric disabilities, a sense of
procedural justice was a distinct and independent factor in satisfac-
tion, so that even those who won felt badly treated from a procedural
fairness point of view.
Nonetheless, it is important to consider whether some proportion
of the difference we find can be explained by neutral factors.  Defin-
ing “legal validity” for this purpose is not difficult—it means a case
that is well-founded in the law and well-supported by the facts.  Unfor-
tunately, we have no external measure of legal validity at either the
administrative or the court level.  For our purposes, a valid case is a
winning case.  We therefore cannot rule out the possibility that cases
brought by people with psychiatric disabilities tend, as a group, to
have poorer factual support.47  As far as legal strength of these claims
go, we can use case law analysis and empirical data from the EEOC to
narrow the bounds of uncertainty.
1. ADA Case Law on Psychiatric Disability
As far as the law on the books is concerned, the story of the ADA
is the narrowing definition of who is protected by the statute at all,
that is, whether the plaintiff is a “qualified individual with a disabil-
ity.”48  The ADA defines “disability” as “a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
47. Some observers have criticized the ADA and other employment discrimination laws
for encouraging frivolous lawsuits by disgruntled employees. E.g., WALTER OLSON, THE
EXCUSE FACTORY: HOW EMPLOYMENT LAW IS PARALYZING THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE (1997);
G.E. Zuriff, Medicalizing Character, 123 PUB. INT. 94, 96 (1996) (“What were in earlier times
considered to be faults of mind and flaws of character are today regarded as ‘psychological
disorders,’ which are, moreover, covered by the ADA.”).  Whatever the merits of these
arguments, they offer no basis for assuming that frivolous lawsuits are brought in dispro-
portionate numbers by people with psychiatric disabilities.
48. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (2006).  This “means an individual with a disability who satis-
fies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the
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activities.”49  The analysis requires first that the plaintiff demonstrate
that her condition is an “impairment,”50 and that the impairment sub-
stantially limits a major life activity without at the same time rendering
the plaintiff unable to do the job with no more than a reasonable
accommodation.51  These determinations must be made on a case-by-
case basis.52  A person is found to be disabled; conditions are not cate-
gorically disabilities.
In matters of psychiatric disability, the EEOC and courts have re-
lied on professional diagnosis and the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion’s (APA) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual in determining whether
specific conditions constitute impairments within the meaning of the
ADA.53  Diagnoses included in the APA manual and recognized by the
courts as at least potentially disabling include major psychiatric dis-
eases such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and depression, as well
as most of the anxiety disorders such as panic disorder, post-traumatic
stress disorder, claustrophobia, and agoraphobia.  Other recognized
disabling conditions include attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
and learning disorder.54  Courts have generally not recognized as im-
employment position such individual holds or desires, and who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position.” Id.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000).
50. “Impairment” means a physical or mental impairment.  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h).  It is
defined as:
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomi-
cal loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, muscu-
loskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs),
cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin,
and endocrine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic
brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
Id. § 1630.2(h)(1)–(2).
51. The text of the ADA provides that “reasonable accommodation may include”:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable
by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a
vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate
adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the
provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations
for individuals with disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
52. Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566 (1999).
53. Karl A. Menninger, II, Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Mental Disability
Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 48 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 3 (1998); see
Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 133 F.3d 141, 143 (1st Cir. 1998) (relying on the APA
manual for definition of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder).
54. E.g., EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: The Americans with Disabilities Act and Psychiatric
Disabilities, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION COORDINATOR § 4:6 (2006); Menninger, supra
note 53, § 3; see also Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 1999) R
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-1\MLR101.txt unknown Seq: 29  8-DEC-06 12:03
122 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 66:94
pairments such conditions as intermittent explosive disorder, compul-
sive gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, sexual behavior disorders,
and psychiatric conditions resulting solely from current illegal drug
use.55
A person with an impairment is not disabled within the meaning
of the ADA unless the impairment substantially limits a major life ac-
tivity.56  These include “functions such as caring for oneself, perform-
ing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning, and working.”57  As interpreted by the EEOC, an impair-
ment “substantially limits” a major life activity only if the person in
question is “[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average
person in the general population can perform” or is “[s]ignificantly
restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an
individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to
the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person
in the general population can perform that same major life activity.”58
There is a certain Catch-22 in the way courts have interpreted the
ADA’s definition of disability, if not in the definition itself—the plain-
tiff is put to the task of showing both that an impairment is serious
enough to substantially limit a major life activity and that it is not so
serious as to render the individual unable to do the job.  This effect
has been heightened for a broad range of treatable disabilities, like
depression or bipolar disorder, by the Supreme Court of the United
States’s ruling that mitigating measures—treatment—should be con-
sidered in determining the effect of an impairment on a major life
activity.59
Reported decisions in psychiatric disability cases illustrate the dif-
ficulties that have developed for plaintiffs under the present interpre-
tation of the statute.  Courts have found that depression did not
significantly impair major life activities because medication had al-
lowed the plaintiff to maintain a seemingly normal family life and ca-
(bipolar disorder); Whalley v. Reliance Group Holdings, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 4018(VM), 2001
WL 55726, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2001) (bipolar disorder); Horwitz v. L & J.G. Stickley,
Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d 350, 354 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (same); Evans v. Magna Group, No.
98–3125, 1999 WL 402401, at *2 (7th Cir. June 11, 1999) (obsessive compulsive disorder);
Rio v. Runyon, 972 F. Supp. 1446, 1455 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (agoraphobia); Gonzales v. Nat’l
Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 225 F.3d 620, 626 (6th Cir. 2000) (learning disorder); Bartlett v. N.Y.
State Bd. of Law Exam’rs, 156 F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 1998) (learning and reading
impairment).
55. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3(d) (2006); Menninger, supra note 53, § 3. R
56. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1).
57. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).
58. Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)–(ii).
59. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999).
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reer for a period of years.60  A person with bipolar disorder failed to
prove her impairment substantially limited a major life activity in part
because her most recent episode of severe anxiety had lasted only six
months and had not prevented her from doing most of her daily tasks
with the help of her husband.61  People with alcoholism, obsessive
compulsive disorder, post-traumatic stress syndrome, stuttering, and
Tourette’s syndrome have all in individual cases failed to convince the
court that their impairments substantially limited their major life ac-
tivities.62  Reviewing the cases, at least some commentators have con-
cluded that the ADA has done little to enable people with psychiatric
disabilities to fight discrimination in the workplace.63
The operative question for this Article, however, is whether peo-
ple with psychiatric disabilities have a harder time than others proving
disability—whether there is anything in the case law that would ex-
plain a pattern of poorer litigation outcomes for people with psychiat-
ric compared to other disabilities.  Casual perusal of case decisions
reveals no such pattern.  People with other disabilities face similar
Catch-22 issues and such specific hurdles as the consideration of miti-
gating measures.64
A more systematic analysis of case decisions also casts doubt on
the suggestion that people with psychiatric disabilities lose more fre-
quently because their cases are legally weaker.  Professor Ruth Colker
used multivariate regression techniques to identify case factors pre-
60. E.g., Swanson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 268 F.3d 307, 316 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that
evidence showed the plaintiff “was impaired in his sleep and communication by his depres-
sion but not substantially limited.  His own statements and actions show that when he was
on Paxil and Prozac, the quality of his sleep improved and he recovered his communica-
tion abilities.”); Cooper v. Olin Corp., Winchester Div., 246 F.3d 1083, 1088–89 (8th Cir.
2001) (determining that a plaintiff who had battled depression for over thirty years was not
substantially limited in her life activities because she worked, raised a family, spoke with
friends, and cared for animals).
61. Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 158–59 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d in part,
vacated in part, 386 F.3d 192, 204–05 (2d Cir. 2004).
62. See Bailey v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 306 F.3d 1162, 1168–69 (1st Cir. 2002) (alcohol-
ism); Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248, 1255 (10th Cir. 2001) (obsessive compulsive
disorder); Marschand v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 876 F. Supp. 1528, 1539–40 (N.D. Ind.
1995) (post-traumatic stress syndrome); Preacely v. Schulte Roth & Zabel, 17 F. App’x 57,
59 (2d Cir. 2001) (stuttering); Ray v. Kroger Co., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1225–26 (S.D. Ga.
2003) (Tourette’s Syndrome).
63. See SUSAN STEFAN, HOLLOW PROMISES, at xiv (2002) (equating the current workplace
environment for those with mental disabilities to “don’t ask, don’t tell”).
64. E.g., Roush v. Weastec, Inc., 96 F.3d 840, 844 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that effec-
tively treated kidney disease was not a disability); see also Eliza Kaiser, The Americans with
Disabilities Act: An Unfulfilled Promise for Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 735, 736 (2004) (arguing that the ADA’s “heart has been cut out” by narrow judi-
cial interpretations of ADA provisions (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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dicting outcomes of published ADA appellate opinions.65  She found
that only two of thirteen categories of disability (impairments of ex-
tremities and diabetes) were significant predictors of a beneficial
plaintiff outcome.66  What she categorized as psychological impair-
ments were actually positively correlated with a pro-plaintiff decision,
though the relationship was not statistically significant.67  In short, at
the appellate level, the evidence does not support the view that people
with psychiatric disabilities have weaker cases than other plaintiffs,
and may even slightly support the proposition that their cases are
stronger.
Prevailing in an ADA case has been difficult for all plaintiffs.  The
rulings that have narrowly interpreted the law have applied generally
to all kinds of disabilities.  People with psychiatric disabilities have
fared worse than others in the published decisions surveyed by the
ABA, but more rigorous statistical analysis does not find that psychiat-
ric disability predicts a poorer outcome.  Because published decisions
constitute the case law applied to future cases, the available evidence
suggests that differences in the outcomes of cases based on psychiatric
versus other types of disability cannot easily be explained by doctrinal
factors.
2. EEOC Ratings and Outcomes
The EEOC maintains a system to rate the strength of cases.  After
the intake interview, investigative staffers assign an “A” to cases that
appear meritorious, a “C” to cases that appear clearly unmeritorious
(typically because of a jurisdictional problem like an employer or an
impairment not covered by the law), and a “B” to cases that require
further investigation to assess.68  Our studies of the ADA administra-
tive charge process consistently found that people with psychiatric dis-
abilities fared worse than people with other forms of disability.  The
overall benefit rate for people with psychiatric disabilities was 10.3%,
compared with 12.7% for persons with other disabilities.  Among the
149,123 charges that had been closed as of September 30, 2000, the
overall benefit rates for depression, schizophrenia, and other psychiat-
ric cases were 9.8%, 9.1%, and 10.9%, respectively, whereas the overall
benefit rates for HIV, kidney, and hearing impairment cases were
65. Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST.
L.J. 239, 243, 266 (2001).
66. Id. at 266, 268, 273.
67. Id. at 266, 268.  She treated substance abuse as a separate category and found it to
be negatively but non-significantly correlated with plaintiff success. Id.
68. Moss et al., Unfunded Mandate, supra note 11, at 22. R
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16.6%, 15.9%, and 15.6%, respectively.69  Much of this difference ap-
peared in multivariate analysis to be mediated through the initial case
categorization decision made by staffers at or shortly after intake.  Psy-
chiatric disabilities were much less likely than others to be rated “A”:
54.2% of HIV cases received an “A” categorization, but only 12.7% of
schizophrenia cases and 13.0% of depression received “A” ratings.70
In multivariate analysis, psychiatric disability accounted for almost a
quarter of the variance in case categorization.
Again, however, these data are hard to interpret.  Is it evidence
that the cases are weaker or that the decisions within the system are
infected with biased decisionmaking against or misinformation about
people with psychiatric disabilities?  As we have explained elsewhere,
the accuracy of this rating system has not been evaluated, and there
are reasons to believe it is poor.71  Further, it is not clear that a true
pattern of weaker cases at the administrative level would be repro-
duced in a sample of cases that reached court: anyone can file a claim
with the EEOC, at low cost and without legal assistance, whereas to
proceed to court with a reasonable hope of winning requires a law-
yer.72  Lawyers can be seen as agents of quality control for the court
system, because they have an incentive to take the strongest cases.  If
the psychiatric disability cases in our sample were weaker than others,
we would expect that significantly more of them would be brought
without a lawyer, but this was not so.73  Thus, even if the EEOC charge
pool tended to have a disproportionate number of weak psychiatric
disability cases, the willingness of lawyers to take psychiatric cases to
federal court at the same general rate as cases involving other disabili-
ties would support the conclusion that the federal claim pool is made
up of cases of comparable quality.
3. Weaker Facts
It is possible that mental disability cases are in some way weaker
on the facts.  Some may think that mental disability ADA cases may be
69. Id. at 92–93.
70. Id. at 94.
71. See id. at 94–95 (explaining that the categorization system is subject to a number of
biases).
72. See Moss et al., Prevalence and Outcomes, supra note 11, at 307 (finding that pro se R
plaintiffs were almost three times less likely than represented parties to obtain benefit from
the legal process).
73. It is possible that lawyers reject a higher proportion of potential ADA clients with
psychiatric disabilities compared to potential clients with other disabilities.  But if this were
true, it would undermine, rather than support, the hypothesis that disability claims reach-
ing court are generally weaker than claims involving other disabilities.
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more likely to involve “acting out” at work—behavior arising from the
disability that constitutes misconduct rather than behavior that may
derogate in some other way from the employer’s preferred course of
events.  It is one thing to accommodate an employee by changing the
layout of the work station or adjusting hours, and quite another to ask
employees or customers to tolerate verbal abuse or even assault.
There are cases where an employee tried to defend verbal abuse or
insubordination by invoking the ADA,74 and such cases have figured
into the political iconography of the ADA as a boondoggle for the
lazy, cunning, or unfit.75  The broader argument is that it might be
systematically harder to deal with people with mental disabilities or
they might bring cases with substantially thornier fact patterns.76  It
would not take that much more complexity to produce the outcome
difference we see in ADA data.
However plausible the suggestion, we are aware of no empirical
data supporting the assertion that psychiatric disability claims are sub-
stantially more likely to present difficult factual scenarios.  In our
study, the fact that lawyers were as willing to take psychiatric as non-
74. See, e.g., Carrozza v. Howard County, 847 F. Supp. 365, 367–68 (D. Md. 1994) (finding
that the employer was justified in taking adverse employment action because of miscon-
duct despite acknowledging that the misconduct may have been caused in part by em-
ployee’s bipolar disorder), aff’d, 45 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Hogarth v.
Thornburgh, 833 F. Supp. 1077, 1086–87 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding that employee was not
“otherwise qualified” for his position because misconduct stemming from bipolar disorder
was likely to reoccur); Mancini v. Gen. Elec. Co., 820 F. Supp. 141, 147 (D. Vt. 1993) (finding
that employee was not “otherwise qualified” because of insubordination caused by an emo-
tional condition).
75. “One case, for example, involved a man who brought a loaded gun to work and
claimed he was protected by a psychiatric disability.”  LaCheen, supra note 41, at 228; see id. R
at 227–28 (describing content of an ABC News Special: The Blame Game).  A well-known
political pundit wrote:
Compassionate government has recently rained new rights and entitlements
so rapidly that you may have missed this beauty: You have a right to be a colossally
obnoxious jerk on the job.
If you are just slightly offensive, your right will not kick in.  But if you are
seriously insufferable to colleagues at work, you have a right not to be fired, and
you are entitled to have your employer make reasonable accommodations for
your “disability.”  That is how the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) is
being construed.
George F. Will, Op-Ed., Protection for the Personality-Impaired, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 1996, at
A31.  Peter Blanck has argued that these sorts of negative media portrayals promote nega-
tive public attitudes about mental disabilities that spill over into the implementation of
remedial programs like the Civil War pension system and the ADA. See Blanck, supra note
18, at 202–08. R
76. Such views have been reported among lawyers. See Disabilities: Mental Disabilities Pose
Challenge For Litigants Under ADA, Attorneys Agree, 178 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) NO. 8, at C-1
(Jan. 12, 2006) (noting that attorneys at a recent conference agreed that federal courts
construe the ADA narrowly in cases involving mental disabilities).
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psychiatric cases tends to negate this hypothesis.77  We would also ex-
pect, if cases involving people with mental disabilities were substan-
tially more likely to involve workplace misconduct, that more cases
would be brought for discharge.  In our sample, people with psychiat-
ric disabilities were slightly more likely than people with other disabili-
ties to bring cases based on discharge, but none of the differences in
basis of suit were statistically significant.
Of course, it may be argued that the very findings we take as evi-
dence of a disparity—the lower settlement rate for psychiatric disabil-
ity cases, the significantly lower rate of monetary settlements, and the
lower absolute amount of monetary settlement—could just as well be
taken as proof that psychiatric cases are, as a group, weaker than other
disability cases.  If the settlement market accurately prices cases based
on their likelihood of winning, then what we have taken as possible
evidence of a disparity is better understood as evidence of a smoothly
functioning system.  We cannot rule this out, but it would mean that
lawyers were consistently wrong about case quality or were more will-
ing to take risks on psychiatric disability cases.  Further, the lower-
quality theory does not fully explain the procedural justice gap.  Be-
cause winning is somewhat correlated with the perception of procedu-
ral justice, lower case quality might explain why people with mental
disabilities as a group are less satisfied than people with other disabili-
ties—they win less often.  It would not explain, however, why winners
with mental disabilities are less satisfied than winners with other disa-
bilities or why losers with mental disabilities are less satisfied with the
procedural justice they received than other losers.78
77. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. But see infra note 78 (suggesting that R
analysis of outcome by perceptibility of diagnosis suggests that psychiatric disability cases
are more difficult to win than non-psychiatric cases).
78. Some early readers of this Article also wondered whether the difference in out-
comes we found comparing psychiatric and non-psychiatric cases might also be explained
on some broader basis through some characteristic common to a number of disabilities
that makes these cases harder to win.  If psychiatric disabilities share such a characteristic,
they are not unique and the outcome differences are therefore not uniquely linked to
mental disability cases.  This suggestion is implausible, however, given the robust and re-
peated finding that psychiatric cases have poorer outcomes on multiple measures com-
pared to other cases. See Moss et al., Unfunded Mandate, supra note 11, at 91–95. R
Nonetheless, in this study we considered one such characteristic, the perceptibility or obvi-
ousness of the disability.  We analyzed the interaction effect of two variables on benefit:
disability type and perceived social labeling of one’s disability.  We found that the social
label works in opposite ways for physical versus psychiatric disabilities.  For people with
physical disabilities, obviousness of the disability is associated with a higher probability of
benefit, whereas for people with mental disabilities, obviousness is associated with lower
chances of a benefit.
This difference in the effect of obviousness would, however, support the suggestion
that psychiatric cases are, as a class, harder to win on the facts than other types of cases.
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In the end, we cannot rule out the possibility that, for a variety of
reasons, the cases brought by people with psychiatric disabilities have
more weaknesses than those brought by others.  The available data,
however, do not strongly support this explanation.  Rather, the availa-
ble evidence makes out a prima facie case of justice disparity.  We now
turn to a second possible response to our data: whether the behavior
that causes the disparity between psychiatric and non-psychiatric cases
is not attributable to the administrative or court systems.
B. Are Defendants or Lawyers to Blame?
There is no doubt that plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities fare
worse than those with non-psychiatric impairments, and that this is
true at both the administrative and federal district court levels.  This
does not mean that the courts or administrative agencies are the
cause.  The reason is that most of these “benefit” outcomes are settle-
ments, which carries two important implications.  First, settled cases
may have afforded little or no opportunity for respondents to interact
with court or administrative personnel.  Second, a settlement requires
willing employers.  If the employer is discriminating—refusing to set-
tle cases that would otherwise settle but for the claimant’s disability—
then we might see lower benefit rates for plaintiffs with psychiatric
disabilities even without active discrimination by judges or administra-
tive personnel.
First, consider discrimination by the employer.  There is some
support for this in the EEOC charge data.  One of the EEOC’s more
successful innovations in the 1990s was the introduction of a voluntary
mediation track for “B” cases.  Mediation earned generally high levels
of satisfaction from litigants and resolved cases efficiently.79  We
found, however, that people with psychiatric disabilities fared worse
than people with other kinds of disabilities at some stages of the medi-
Proving that one satisfies the definition of “qualified person with a disability” is the great
hurdle ADA plaintiffs face.  Non-obviousness could make it legitimately more difficult to
prove impairment in physical disability cases like back pain, whereas obviousness could
well make it more difficult to prove job performance qualifications in psychiatric disability
cases.  If having an obvious disability—usually an advantage—is a disadvantage for people
with psychiatric disabilities, we would expect them to lose more often than others.
This explanation raises broader concerns of stigma.  If a person reveals a hidden back
problem, others will not reject, fear, blame, or ridicule the person (assuming the claim is
not deemed a lie).  But others may tolerate a mental illness far less well, regardless of one’s
behavior.  Stigma may rain down on people with all kinds of disabilities, but it may fall
harder on those with mental disabilities in the ADA process, because they are blamed for
hijacking the ADA from its original noble purpose: protecting people with “real” disabili-
ties. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. R
79. Moss et al., Unfunded Mandate, supra note 11, at 36–37. R
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ation process.80  Employers were significantly less willing to mediate
with claimants who had psychiatric disabilities than with those who
had other kinds of disabilities, though it was not just employers who
seemed to discriminate: EEOC staff were slightly but significantly less
likely to refer individuals with psychiatric disabilities than people with
other disabilities to its mediation program.81
An employer might discriminate in settlement situations for at
least two reasons.  First, employers might have stronger negative atti-
tudes toward people with psychiatric disabilities, and simply be more
averse to employing or advancing the person.  Studies show that em-
ployers view people with psychiatric disabilities with more prejudice
than people with other disabilities.82  Second, employers might calcu-
late that they are more likely to win in court against a claim from a
stigmatized mentally ill employee than a physically disabled employee,
and so might be less inclined to settle with such a litigant.  The prob-
lem for present purposes is that neither of these explanations actually
exonerates the legal system from responsibility, if only for a failure to
remediate.  If settlement systematically works to the disadvantage of
people with psychiatric disabilities, whether because employer animus
is greater or employers believe they have a better chance of winning in
court, then a system that depends on settlement is passively allowing
unfair practices to persist.  As Owen Fiss famously opined, civil settle-
ment can be seen as “the civil analogue of plea bargaining,” a prob-
lematic concession to the conditions of mass society.83  The argument
that our outcome disparity is the result of employer behavior may re-
lieve judges and administrators of blame, but does not remove their
responsibility to act.84
80. Moss et al., Mediation, supra note 11, at 991–92. R
81. Id. at 992.
82. See Gary L. Albrecht et al., Social Distance from the Stigmatized: A Test of Two Theories,
16 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1319, 1323–24 (1982) (finding that mental illness stigmatizes an em-
ployee more than other selected physical disabilities based on data collected from profes-
sionals and managers); John L. Tringo, The Hierarchy of Preference Toward Disability Groups, 4
J. SPECIAL EDUC. 295, 299–300 (1970) (finding that students separated into several control
groups were overall less accepting of mental illness than other tested disabilities).  These
studies are discussed in Marjorie L. Baldwin, Can the ADA Achieve Its Employment Goals?, 549
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 37, 44 (1997).
83. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984).
84. As we will discuss infra, settlement presents a challenge from the procedural justice
standpoint—a challenge that goes both to the quality of the legal process and the use of a
procedural justice framework in assessing that quality.  Where most cases settle, litigants
cannot reasonably react to the procedure because they have little or no experience with
the legal process.  Reinforcing Fiss’s observation, we would be seeing a trade-off between
resolving cases and offering people the benefits of procedures that feel fair.  As Tom Tyler
observed, the Supreme Court’s conception of “due process” has been sensitive to the psy-
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What if the lawyer is to blame?  After all, most parties experience
the legal system through the lawyer.  Their perceptions of voice, fair-
ness, or dignified treatment may be shaped by what their lawyer tells
them or how their lawyer treats them.  Likewise, a lawyer’s confidence
in the client and her story is presumably quite important in the law-
yer’s approach to settlement and valuation of the case.85  As shown in
Table 3, what we called “lawyer engagement” was a significant predic-
tor of satisfaction for plaintiffs generally.  As might be expected, peo-
ple were more satisfied with their litigation experience if their lawyers
listened to their concerns, investigated the facts, and kept them in-
formed of the progress of the case.  But, as Table 4 shows, this was
equally true regardless of disability type.  The behavior of one’s lawyer
accounts for some part of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with litigation,
but it does not let the courts or agencies off the hook, nor does it
account for any satisfaction disparity between people with psychiatric
disabilities versus other types of disabilities.
C. Is the Satisfaction Disparity an Artifact of the Disability Itself?
A skeptic could point out that we rely on plaintiffs’ subjective ap-
praisal and self-report of procedural justice, and that people with psy-
chiatric illnesses may have impaired judgment about these things.  In
particular, depressive illness can affect cognition and distort reality,
making things seem much worse than they would appear to a non-
depressed observer.86  Plaintiffs with depression might tend to give a
gloomier appraisal—because of their mood symptoms—of whether
they were treated fairly and respectfully and were given an adequate
chance to tell their story.  This is relevant because depression is the
most common illness in our sample of people with psychiatric
disabilities.
One thing that tends to rule out this explanation is that people
with psychiatric disabilities have an objective reason for dissatisfaction.
chological impact of court proceedings: “[w]hen conceptualized this way, due process in-
volves giving people judicial procedures that they will perceive as fair.”  Tyler, supra note
24, at 434–35. R
85. See Michael L. Perlin, “You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks”: Sanism in Clinical Teach-
ing, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 683, 684 (2003) (arguing that a lawyer’s negative attitudes towards
people with psychiatric disabilities could impair advocacy efforts).
86. E.g., DAVID A. CLARK ET AL., SCIENTIFIC FOUNDATIONS OF COGNITIVE THEORY AND
THERAPY OF DEPRESSION 115 (1999); James C. Coyne & Ian H. Gotlib, The Role of Cognition in
Depression: A Critical Appraisal, 94 PSYCHOL. BULL. 472, 472–73 (1983); Susan Krantz & Con-
stance Hammen, Assessment of Cognitive Bias in Depression, 88 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 611, 611
(1979); Rachel M. Msetfi et al., Depressive Realism and Outcome Density Bias in Contingency
Judgments: The Effect of the Context and Intertrial Interval, 134 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL: GEN.
10, 10 (2005).
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They really do get worse results in their ADA cases—fewer settle-
ments, fewer decisions in their favor—than people with other disabili-
ties.  In our data, there is a strong and significant negative association
between psychiatric disability and beneficial outcome in the court re-
cord, which does not depend on any perception or report from the
plaintiff.  A successful outcome, in turn, is highly correlated with the
perception of procedural justice.
We also evaluated whether a plaintiff’s mood affected our data:
interviewers’ ratings of the quality of the responses were to be marked
down specifically if the respondent seemed depressed.  There was no
significant relationship between psychiatric disabilities versus other
disabilities and the interviewers’ ratings of the quality of responses.
We then ran the model for comparing predictors of overall satisfac-
tion between psychiatric and non-psychiatric disabilities, controlling
for: (1) interviewers’ rating of the quality of responses; (2) self-rated
health status (which tends to be worse for people with depression);
and (3) whether the respondent thought others viewed him or her as
disabled.87  The net negative association between psychiatric disability
status and procedural justice remained statistically significant.
To address the possibility that the analysis might be misleading
because we combined depression with other psychiatric disabilities, we
divided the respondents with psychiatric disabilities into two groups:
depression and other (for example, schizophrenia and bipolar ill-
ness).  It turns out that outcomes and perceptions of procedural jus-
tice are even worse for plaintiffs who did not have depression but
some other psychiatric disorder.88  However, the association between
objective outcomes in the lawsuit and perceived procedural justice is
uniformly strong, irrespective of the type of disability claimed by the
plaintiff.  These analyses together convincingly rule out the suggestion
that the disparity in satisfaction is all in the plaintiffs’ minds.
Having canvassed a variety of explanations, we hold the evidence
to support the theory that the differences in benefits and perceptions
of procedural fairness uncovered by our data are disparities—prob-
lematic variations that cannot be explained by legitimate differences
between psychiatric and non-psychiatric disability cases.  Case law does
not explain the variance.  We cannot reject the possibility that psychi-
atric cases are weaker, but the evidence does not support this proposi-
tion.  We cannot rule out the related suggestion that employer activity
is to blame, but blaming employers does not really let the court system
87. See supra p. 115 tbl.4.
88. See infra p. 132 fig.3.
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FIGURE 3.  PERCENT OF PLAINTIFFS RECEIVING A BENEFICIAL OUTCOME
AND HIGH RATING OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE FROM ADA TITLE I


















off the hook.  Similarly, lawyers do not appear, from our data, to be
blameworthy either.  Finally, we do not see evidence in our study that
the disparity in procedural justice is an artifact of the disability itself, a
mood effect, though this is possible.  At this point, then, we have a
plausible finding of disparities in the application of the ADA to peo-
ple with psychiatric disabilities.
D. Causes of the Disparities: “Clinical Uncertainty,” Stereotype,
or Prejudice?
Michael Perlin has coined the term “sanism” to name a cultural
bias against people with psychiatric disabilities.
I define “sanism” as “an irrational prejudice of the same
quality and character of other irrational prejudices that
cause (and are reflected in) prevailing social attitudes of ra-
cism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry.”  It infects
both our jurisprudence and our lawyering practices.  Sanism
is largely invisible, and largely socially acceptable.  It is based
predominantly upon stereotype, myth, superstition, and dei-
ndividualization.  It is sustained and perpetuated by our use
of alleged “ordinary common sense” . . . and heuristic rea-
soning in an unconscious response to events both in every-
day life and in the legal process.89
89. Perlin, supra note 18, at 536 (footnotes omitted).  Perlin’s rhetoric is at the dra- R
matic end of the spectrum, but other commentators agree that “basic concepts about the
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Perlin and others have argued that the sanist stigma pervades the
legal system for addressing issues related to psychiatric disabilities,
particularly in the civil commitment area.90  In an article published
soon after the ADA was passed, Perlin warned of the danger that sanist
attitudes among judges and others would affect the implementation
of the ADA and undermine its potential “to make any true headway in
restructuring the way that citizens with mental disabilities are dealt
with by society.”91
The notion of sanism is useful in the way it points to culture as a
source of continuing unfair treatment of people with mental illness.
As an analytic tool for explaining our data, however, sanism is rather
fuzzy.  Fortunately, the causes of health disparities have been ex-
amined with considerable care and subtlety.  Drawing upon that work,
we may distinguish three reasons why actors in the ADA enforcement
system might treat people with mental disabilities worse than other
plaintiffs: prejudice, stereotypical thinking, and professional uncer-
tainty.92  These explanations are not mutually exclusive at either the
individual or the population level.  All could be playing some role in
creating disparities.  They do, however, require different responses.
Prejudice is a simple explanation for poor treatment.  It is possi-
ble that EEOC investigators, lawyers, court personnel, and judges con-
sciously harbor hostile or stigmatized views of people with mental
illness, and act accordingly.  Our findings point to the distinct possi-
bility that people with psychiatric disabilities may encounter more
prejudice in the ADA Title I enforcement process than those with
other disabilities.  Research has consistently shown that people with
psychiatric disabilities are among the most stigmatized groups in soci-
ety and that they are harmed in their daily life activities by myths,
nature of mental illness, shared across cultural, legal, and policy domains, have a pervasive
effect on law and social policy.”  William Spaulding et al., Applications of Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence in Rehabilitation for People with Severe and Disabling Mental Illness, 17 T.M. COOLEY L.
REV. 135, 135–36 (2000).  Misinformation persists, and it influences both individual case
outcomes and evolving social and professional attitudes.
90. See, e.g., Pamela R. Champine, A Sanist Will?, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 547 (2003)
(discussing the prejudicial attitudes towards those suffering from mental illness in the law
of wills); Claire B. Steinberger, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: The “Sanist” Factor—An Interdiscipli-
nary Approach, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 573 (2003) (discussing the application of the sanist
perspective within therapeutic jurisprudence).
91. Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons With Mental Disabilities: Can Sanist Attitudes be
Undone?, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 15, 22 (1993–1994) (emphasis omitted).
92. The typology here is taken from Balsa & McGuire, supra note 15, at 90. See also R
Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimi-
nation and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1173 (1995) (using similar
approach focused on stereotyping in Title VII discrimination analysis).
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stereotypes, and stigmas associated with their impairments.93  Further-
more, socio-legal research and theory alike consistently hold that ac-
tors in the legal system do not shed their socialization at the
courthouse door, but rather bring with them the same attitudes and
prejudices found in the population at large.94  It seems possible then
that negative attitudes about individuals with psychiatric and other
types of impairments have a pervasive influence on behaviors within
the legal system, and influenced our actual outcome and satisfaction
data.  If prejudice is causing discrimination, the civil justice system
faces a challenge that may not be amenable to education strategies,
but at the same time will be difficult to police by rules—after all, the
discrimination would be arising among the very officials charged with
enforcing antidiscrimination laws.
A second and more psychologically nuanced possibility is that al-
though they are not motivated by conscious ill-feeling, actors in the
ADA enforcement system hold, and act on, stereotypes about the
mentally disabled that, while not motivated by conscious ill-feeling,
tend to produce different and second-class treatment.  This view is
more consistent with the general trend in academic theory about dis-
crimination, which places it more and more in the realm of cultural
or “structural” phenomena.95  Stereotypes are ubiquitous, a common
93. E.g., Bruce G. Link et al., The Consequences of Stigma for the Self-Esteem of People With
Mental Illnesses, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1621, 1624–25 (2001); Richard A. Van Dorn et al., A
Comparison of Stigmatizing Attitudes Toward Persons with Schizophrenia in Four Stakeholder
Groups: Perceived Likelihood of Violence and Desire for Social Distance, 68 PSYCHIATRY: INTERPER-
SONAL & BIOLOGICAL PROCESSES 152, 152–54 (2005); see also Albrecht et al., supra note 82, at R
1323–24; Tringo, supra note 82, at 295. R
94. See, e.g., Kathryn Moss, Institutional Reform through Litigation, 58 SOC. SERV. REV. 421,
428–29 (1984) (discussing how staff views negatively impact implementation of federal
court mandates to reform mental institutions); Perlin, supra note 91, at 30–31 (arguing R
that judges are not immune from stereotypical attitudes pervading society about those with
mental disabilities).
95. Professor Samuel Bagenstos reviews this “structural turn” in antidiscrimination law
in Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL.
L. REV. 1 (2006).  He points to two major elements of this school of analysis:
First, relying on the findings of social scientists (particularly social psychologists),
many scholars contend that modern-day employment discrimination is character-
ized less by overt, intentional discrimination than by unconscious or subtle biases.
Second, a number of scholars observe that changes in the nature and organiza-
tion of work over the past few decades have made employment discrimination less
a problem of discrete, harmful management decisions and more a problem aris-
ing from workplace interactions among workers at all levels of an occupational
hierarchy.
Id. at 4–5; see also Krieger, supra note 92, at 1214 (arguing that research in psychology R
undermines the view that conscious intent or motive drive discriminatory behavior); Per-
lin, supra note 85, at 684 (arguing that unconscious stereotypes about people with mental R
illness influence decisionmaking throughout the legal system).
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part of an individual’s cognitive repertoire; people use stereotypes to
“simplify and organize social information.”96  Mental illness is com-
plex, and few lawyers and judges ever formally study it.  Confronted
with a client to help or a case to decide, the uninformed actor fills in
the gaps with whatever information is at hand.  The well-intentioned
attorney might have a hard time understanding the situation of a cli-
ent with depression and resort to generalizations to plug the informa-
tion gap.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys may believe that people with depression
will make poorer witnesses, and settle for a lower amount; or defend-
ants and their attorneys may believe that manic-depressive illness is
less controllable than other conditions, and be less willing to accept a
settlement involving reinstatement; or judges may believe that mental
illness is harder to diagnose than other conditions and doubt that a
plaintiff actually has an impairment covered by the law.97  If this sort
of behavior is contributing to justice disparities, the primary prescrip-
tion would be to educate civil justice professionals about mental ill-
ness and their sub-optimal reasoning in psychiatric disability cases.
A third explanation for disparate treatment is that legal actors
face greater uncertainty in assessing cases involving mental disability
and treat these cases differently.  This is analogous to the problem of
“clinical uncertainty” in health care disparities, which turns on the
fact that there may be real differences based on race or gender, such
that the outcome disparity arises not from stereotyping or bias but
from responding sub-optimally to a real difference.98  If psychiatric
disability cases are somehow different from other cases, the clinical
uncertainty problem goes to whether actors in the legal system are
responding effectively to these differences in order to produce out-
comes for people with psychiatric disabilities that are as satisfactory as
the outcomes for others.  Here we would not be considering legal or
factual differences that would justify a different outcome, but differ-
ences that might require different “treatment.”  For example, a client
with a psychiatric disability might have a harder time explaining a case
that is as meritorious on both the facts and the law as a case brought
by a person with a non-psychiatric disability.  Disparities could arise if
lawyers or judges are unable to deal effectively with this difference in
case presentation.  Like the problem of stereotyping, information and
96. Balsa & McGuire, supra note 15, at 103 (citation omitted). R
97. Perlin contends that lawyers who deploy stereotypical thinking about mental ill-
ness: “(1) distrust their mentally disabled clients, (2) trivialize their complaints, (3) fail to
forge authentic attorney-client relationships . . . and reject their clients’ potential contribu-
tions to case-strategizing, and (4) take less seriously case outcomes that are adverse to their
clients.” Perlin, supra note 85, at 695. R
98. See Balsa & McGuire, supra note 15, at 96. R
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educational strategies are a sensible response, with a particular em-
phasis on skills building for dealing effectively with real differences in
psychiatric disability cases.
Our study neither demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that
any of these mechanisms are at work in the ADA enforcement system,
nor points to any particular actors as perpetrators.  Disparity is not
necessarily the result of bias or conscious discrimination.  It is possible
that the sense of unfair treatment we found among people with psy-
chiatric disabilities rests on some sort of misperception or misunder-
standing.  We cannot resolve this uncertainty, but that is hardly the
point.  What our study shows is a robust pattern of outcome and satis-
faction disparity to which attention must be paid.
E. What Is to Be Done?
Just as the problem of health disparities has animated a substan-
tial amount of inquiry into our health care system, the legal system
cannot morally ignore justice disparities.  The reasons for justice dis-
parities are likely to be many and complex, and will continue to exert
their influence until they are understood and addressed in a compara-
bly thorough way by bar associations, court administrators, and the
elected and appointed officials responsible for the operation of the
system.99
Sadly, a justice disparity for people with psychiatric disabilities
would not be unique.  For twenty years or more, courts and bar as-
sociations have sought to understand and deal with persistent percep-
tions of racial, ethnic, and gender bias in the administration of
justice.100  Their work has charted a responsible course of action.
99. Perlin predicts the need for what he aptly called “hearts and minds” strategies in
the implementation of the ADA:
The simple official repudiation of discriminatory practices is not enough to
significantly alter the distorted cognitive processes that still frequently dominate
our thinking and decision-making.  There have been no attempts, so far, to an-
swer the question that has bedeviled civil rights activists since the 1950’s: how to
capture “the hearts and minds” of the American public so as to best insure that
statutorily and judicially articulated rights are incorporated—freely and will-
ingly—into the day-to-day fabric and psyche of society.  Unless advocates turn
their attention to these attitudinal questions, the ADA may—in “real life”—turn
out to be little more than the last in a long (and depressing) series of “paper
victories” for mentally ill individuals.
Perlin, supra note 91, at 22–23 (footnotes omitted). R
100. In a frequently cited study, the National Center for State Courts found that non-
whites (especially African Americans) had a poorer opinion of the court system on virtually
all dimensions, from satisfaction with court performance to perceived fair treatment by
court personnel. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, HOW THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE STATE
COURTS: A 1999 NATIONAL SURVEY 7–8 (1999).  More than twenty states have organized task
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First, we need more information.  There is no question that people
with mental disabilities do worse.  But there are many questions
whether this constitutes a disparity or why it occurs.  As far as we can
determine, major surveys and task force reports on justice disparities
have not encompassed inquiries into the views or experiences of peo-
ple with disabilities.101
Action need not await further research.  The efforts to deal with
race and gender bias have provided a sensible list of measures that are
equally applicable to disability disparities.102  Both stereotyping and
uncertainty can be dealt with through efforts to educate the bench,
the bar, and the civil justice workforce, though education is hardly a
panacea.103  Generally, trial verdicts can be improved by eliminating
barriers to jury service for people with disabilities and in particular for
mental disabilities.  Complaints or satisfaction surveys can provide use-
ful feedback, and may be facilitated by user-friendly procedures or the
use of an ombudsman.  As in the race and gender areas, it is reasona-
ble to assume that diversity in the workforce makes a difference.
Those who appoint judges, and hire lawyers, court staff, and law
professors, can fight stigma and stereotyping directly by endeavoring
to exclude these factors from their decisions.  The ability of people
who have experienced mental illness to be as open about their condi-
tions as those who have other diseases will be the best measure of the
legal system’s success in fighting structural discrimination.  Finally,
legislatures can contribute by funding efforts to deal with disparities,
monitoring results, and considering the positive or negative effects of
new legislation on justice disparities.
Our findings have broader implications for employment rights
enforcement generally.  We found that dissatisfaction with the experi-
ence of bringing a claim was rife across all disabilities.  The procedu-
ral justice literature shows that people value fair procedures, but in a
real sense, most people who bring an ADA or other employment dis-
forces or committees to study gender, racial, or ethnic bias, and to propose remedies. See
Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Race & Ethnic Fairness Initiative, http://www.ncsconline.org/
Projects_Initiatives/REFI/SearchState.asp (last visited Oct. 3, 2006) (containing links to
state task force reports).  For a compendium of recommendations for change, see ABA
COALITION FOR JUSTICE, AM. BAR ASS’N, ATTACKING BIAS IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM: A COMPEN-
DIUM OF PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES (2000), available at http://www.abanet.org/justice/
judicialbias/home.html; MADELYNN HERMAN, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, ACHIEVING
FAIRNESS THROUGH BIAS-FREE BEHAVIOR: A POCKET GUIDE FOR THE COURTS (2005).
101. See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 100, at 37 (collecting data on R
perceptions of equal treatment by wealth, race or ethnicity, and gender, but not disability).
102. E.g., ABA COALITION FOR JUSTICE, supra note 100. R
103. See Perlin, supra note 85, at 689–90 (arguing that “[m]erely educating lawyers” with- R
out addressing underlying attitudes will fail to produce behavior change).
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crimination claim do not experience much procedure at all.  An ADA,
Title VII, or Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) plaintiff
who files a claim with the EEOC may never have direct contact with an
investigator after the intake interview or a chance to give voice to her
claim.  If a case is filed in federal court, chances are it will be settled or
dismissed with no more than a deposition and an interview or two
with the lawyer.  If people consistently value the chance to tell their
stories independently of outcome, as the procedural justice literature
seems to establish,104 we have a chronic trade-off between the way
cases have traditionally been resolved by the EEOC or federal
courts—on motion or through settlement—and satisfaction.  The
EEOC mediation program can be seen as an outstandingly successful
effort to avoid this trade-off, and the wider use of such alternative dis-
pute resolution methods has been recommended for Title I mental
disability cases by experts in therapeutic jurisprudence.105  More use
of alternative dispute resolution devices could improve matters in fed-
eral court, but it seems unlikely that courts will ever be capable of
giving employment discrimination litigants a satisfactory level of pro-
cedural justice.  Most complaints involve complicated facts and small
stakes, so the costs of individualized attention by lawyers and judges
are just too high.  Thus, our findings demonstrate yet again the ur-
gent need for Congress to give the EEOC the resources it reasonably
requires to provide real dispute resolution services to the employers
and employees whose cases come before it.106
104. See MacCoun, supra note 21, at 172 (“[T]he most popular motivation cited by liti- R
gants was to ‘tell my side of the story.’”); see also Tyler, supra note 24, at 436–37 (noting that R
satisfaction in the legal process is related to the way decisions are reached, not the ultimate
outcome).
105. See Dorfman, supra note 40, at 117–20.  The therapeutic benefits of litigating in- R
clude interpreting and shaping the ADA, deterring noncompliant employers that are likely
to be held responsible for Title I violations, making the statement that the mentally dis-
abled person’s grievance is worthy of litigation, and providing the mentally disabled with
the opportunity to be heard in a formal setting with the procedural protections and dignity
of the court. Id. at 115–16.  The therapeutic benefits of ADR include the opportunity for
the mentally disabled to have complaints heard but without the cost and stress of formal
courtroom proceedings, an increased likelihood of finding a competent advocate because
attorney representation is not required, the flexibility of multiple types of ADR, and
greater control over the proceedings by the mentally disabled person, such as choice over
the selection of facilitator or arbitrator. Id. at 118–19.  Professor Dorfman concludes that
the benefits of ADR, along with the fact that the mentally disabled person retains the right
to go to court if not satisfied with the result, are persuasive reasons for recommending
ADR as the more therapeutic means of enforcing implementation of Title I. Id. at 120.
106. We discussed this point in length in Moss et al., Unfunded Mandate, supra note 11, at R
104–07.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The ADA contains strong enforcement provisions.  Two of its
four purposes were “to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable
standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabili-
ties” and “to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role
in enforcing the standards established in this [Act] on behalf of indi-
viduals with disabilities.”107  While much attention has rightfully been
paid to the considerable limitations placed upon this landmark law in
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States,108 much less at-
tention has been paid to ADA enforcement.109  Indeed, this is the first
empirical study that we know of examining the experiences of people
with disabilities who are personally familiar with the ADA Title I en-
forcement process.
Our study is evidence of problematic justice disparities.  Com-
plainants with psychiatric disabilities believe that they fare worse than
complainants with non-psychiatric disabilities, and complainants with
psychiatric disabilities actually do fare worse than complainants with
non-psychiatric disabilities in the ADA Title I enforcement process.
These disparities are not easily explained by differences in the law, the
behavior of employers or lawyers, or the effects of psychiatric illness
on perception.  Nor does the lower rate of actual success explain the
lower rate of satisfaction.  As has been found in other procedural jus-
tice studies, losing tends to reduce satisfaction, but even losers can
find satisfaction if given a fair hearing, a chance to articulate their
concerns, and dignified treatment.  Even accounting for the influence
of outcome, people with psychiatric disabilities experienced less pro-
cedural justice than others.
The disparities are clear.  The causes are not.  We do not attri-
bute the disparities to bigotry, nor could we from our data.  Both the
disparities themselves and their causes remain, to some degree, uncer-
tain.  What should not be doubted is the need for a vigorous response
to these findings that will dig into causation and produce action to
ensure that the system that protects people from discrimination does
not discriminate.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2)–(3) (2000).
108. E.g., Ronald Turner, The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Workplace: A Study of
the Supreme Court’s Disabling Choices and Decisions, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 379 (2004);
Shaina Walter, ADA: Supreme Court Disallows Disparate Impact Analysis of Facially Valid Employ-
ment Procedures, 32 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 373 (2004); Andrea Kloehn Naef, Note, Toyota
Motor Manufacturing v. Williams: A Case of Carpal Tunnel Syndrome Weakens the Grip of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 575 (2004).
109. For an exception, see Moss et al., Prevalence and Outcomes, supra note 11. R
